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Learning new material may retroactively interfere with memory for older material. 
Retroactive interference research has typically focused on how similarity between old 
and new material affects recall of old material, which predicts greatest interference when 
similar material is presented just before test. However, mental effort may be another 
source of retroactive interference that could disrupt consolidation: Mental effort could 
cause the most retroactive interference when presented just after study. In Experiment 1, 
participants engaged in tasks designed to induce mental effort (e.g., solving easy or 
difficult math problems) at various times between the study and test of an associative 
recognition task. Although familiarity estimates were unaffected, the timing of mental 
effort affected recollection estimates. In Experiment 2, participants engaged in a different 
set of tasks designed to induce mental effort (e.g., solving easy or difficult anagrams) and 
increase similarity. Again, familiarity estimates were unaffected; however, mental effort 
marginally affected recollection estimates, but in a way that was inconsistent with 
expectations. The results showed inconsistent mental effort effects overall, consistent 
with some past research showing that mental effort may not always cause retroactive 
interference. The results also highlight the importance of a deeper investigation of 
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Retroactive interference occurs when new material learned during the retention 
interval of a memory test decreases memory for old material. Retroactive interference can 
be item-specific or nonspecific. Item-specific RI occurs when there is a strong 
correspondence between old and new material—for example, learning ‘apple’ interferes 
with learning ‘pear’. Item-specific retroactive interference increases with the similarity 
between old and new materials (for reviews, see M. C. Anderson et al., 1994 and M. C. 
Anderson, 2003; cf. McGeoch, 1942). Non-specific retroactive interference occurs when 
there is little to no correspondence between old and new material. This nonspecific 
retroactive interference is thought to increase with the mental effort associated with 
learning new material or with decreasing the delay between learning old and new 
material.(Dewar, Cowan, & Della Sala, 2007; Lechner, Squire, & Byrne, 1999; Müller & 
Pilzecker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925, 1933; Wixted, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2010). Past research 
found an inverted-U relationship between recall of old material and the timing of learning 
new material, supporting the view that mental effort and similarity cause retroactive 
interference in different ways (Wixted, 2004b). However, retroactive interference usually 
has been measured with recall tasks: Few experiments have investigated retroactive 
interference in recognition memory (but see Heine, 1914, as cited in McKinney, 1935). 
The current study investigated the effects of mental effort and similarity on recognition 
memory performance.  
The current literature review will focus on mental effort and similarity. The first 
section will introduce early research on mental effort. The second section will discuss 
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recent neurological research on mental effort. The third section will discuss early and 
recent research on similarity. The fourth section will discuss recognition memory 
research, linking mental effort and similarity effects to recognition memory processes. 
Mental Effort as Retroactive Interference 
Mental effort is the subjective state of mental demand that occurs while learning 
new material or while engaged in nonspecific tasks (Dewar et al., 2007; Müller & 
Pilzecker, 1900). In general, mental effort decreases memory performance: Early 
research found worse recall after a “filled” period of mental effort (e.g. solving 
multiplication problems) than after a relatively “unfilled” period of rest (Baldwin & Shaw, 
1895; Calkins, 1896; DeCamp, 1915; Lechner et al., 1999; Lewy, 1895; Müller & 
Pilzecker, 1900; Münsterberg & Campbell, 1894; Skaggs, 1925; Warren & Shaw, 1895), 
suggesting that mental effort causes RI. 
. Early research also found a nonlinear relationship between recall and the timing 
of learning new material (see Figure 1)—the temporal point of interpolation (TPI): 
Participants had worse memory when new material was learned just after study and just 
before test, but they had better recall when new material was learned midway between 
study and test (Archer & Underwood, 1951; Newton & Wickens, 1956; Postman & Alper, 
1946; Sisson, 1939; Wixted, 2004b). This temporal gradient of retroactive interference is 
consistent with the view that there are two sources of retroactive interference, mental 
effort that disrupts consolidation and similarity that affects retrieval (for discussion of 
similarity, see section titled “Similarity and Response Competition”). 
One idea that has been closely tied to retroactive interference is consolidation. 
Consolidation refers to a process that stabilizes memories. Evidence for consolidation 
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comes from Ebbinghaus’s forgetting curve (1885/1913), which plots amount of forgotten 
material over time. Mathematical descriptions of this forgetting curve suggest that that 
the proportion of material forgotten continually decreases over time (Wixted & Ebbesen, 
1991; Wixted, 2004a). This is consistent with the view that consolidation increasingly 
protects memories from retroactive interference over time. Thus, more consolidated 
memories should be less susceptible to RI than less consolidated memories. Similarly, 
retroactive interference should affect memory more when presented just after study (less 
consolidation) compared to a delay (more consolidation).  
Two laws of forgetting may reflect two sides of the same ‘consolidation’ coin 
(Wixted, 2004b): First, Jost’s Law (the second tenet) holds that, given two memories of 
equal strength, the newer memory will decay more rapidly than the older memory. 
Second, Ribot’s law holds that hippocampal damage causes temporally graded retrograde 
amnesia, that is, worse memory for newer than older memories (e.g., Nadel & 
Moscovitch, 1997, 2001). Thus, the hippocampus may consolidate memories: Newer 
memories may have consolidated less than older memories. Therefore, disrupting 
consolidation—by retroactive interference or by hippocampus damage —should affect 
newer memories more than older memories. 
Müller and Pilzecker (1900, for review, see Lechner et al., 1999), in their original 
theory of RI, proposed that mental effort disrupts consolidation. First, they noticed that 
memories come to mind as afterimages after participants learn material, especially within 
the first 5 minutes after study. These uncued and spontaneous remindings were thought to 
consolidate memories and strengthen associations between them. Second, they found that 
mental effort made memory worse compared to rest (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900, as cited 
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in Lechner et al., 1999). Third, and more importantly, mental effort made memory worse 
when presented shortly after study than when delayed, demonstrating a temporal gradient 
of nonspecific retroactive interference (i.e., mental effort). As noted earlier, this temporal 
gradient was replicated in other studies (Wixted, 2004b). Therefore, mental effort was 
thought to disrupt the occurrence of uncued remindings that facilitated consolidation 
(Lechner et al., 1999; Wixted, 2004a, 2004b) 
Some early research did not support theory about mental effort (McGeoch & 
McDonald, 1931; Robinson, 1920, 1927). In some cases, mental effort did not decrease 
recall relative to rest: Only learning similar materials decreased recall (e.g. Robinson, 
1920). In other cases, the temporal gradient of retroactive interference was not found 
(Wixted, 2004b). Unfortunately, these early mental effort experiments were flawed or 
had confounds (Skaggs, 1933; Wixted, 2004b): Participants read newspapers or spoke 
with the experimenter during unfilled conditions, likely inducing some degree of mental 
effort (McGeoch & McDonald, 1931; Robinson, 1920), and participants could have 
rehearsed old material more in unfilled than in filled conditions. Additionally, some 
studies only used two points of TPI when at least three points are necessary to find 
temporal effects (Wixted, 2004b). When considered with the experiments reviewed 
earlier, these limitations warrant further investigation of mental effort as a source of 
retroactive interference that disrupts consolidation (Wixted, 2004b). 
Is Mental Effort New Learning? 
One way the hippocampus could consolidate memory is through long-term 
potentiation, a resource-dependent (e.g. protein synthesis) synaptic plasticity mechanism 
that enhances neuronal communication (Dudai, 2004; Hebb, 1949). Over several hours, 
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long-term potentiation transitions between early and late phases, which could help 
convert memory from short-term to long-term storage (Dudai, 2004). Wixted (2004b) 
proposed that consolidation is a constant force that increasingly hardens memories from 
retroactive interference over time and can thus account for the shape of forgetting curves 
over longer timescales (Bahrick, 1984, as cited in Wixted, 2010). Thus, the temporal 
transitions in long-term potentiation are consistent with the temporal gradient of 
retroactive interference, suggesting that older memories are more likely to be 
consolidated (old long-term potentiation) and stored in long-term memory than newer 
memories (new long-term potentiation). 
Wixted’s (2004b) theory of retroactive interference states that old and new long-
term potentiation compete for limited physiological resources in the hippocampus: He 
hypothesized that mental effort is new learning that preferentially leads to new long-term 
potentiation over old long-term potentiation in the hippocampus. It should be noted that 
long-term potentiation happens in other brain regions. However, long-term potentiation in 
the hippocampus could be especially important for consolidation of declarative memory 
(see section “Retroactive Interference in Recognition Memory”). Indeed, there is a long 
history of research demonstrating the link between the hippocampus and declarative 
memory (Scoville & Milner, 1957; Warrington, 1968; Yonelinas, 2002). For example, 
performance in recall tasks or tasks that increase demands on recall-like processes 
depends on hippocampal integrity. Three lines of evidence support Wixted’s theory of 
retroactive interference.     
First, there is some evidence to support the idea that mental effort disrupts 
consolidation in the hippocampus (Wixted, 2004a). If the hippocampus is critical for 
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consolidation, then mental effort should disrupt consolidation more in patients with 
damage to the hippocampus than in healthy controls. One group of patients who have 
damage including the hippocampus are amnestic mild cognitive impaired patients. Indeed, 
compared to controls, these patients show larger mental effort effects that are also 
temporally graded (Dewar, Della Sala, Beschin, & Cowan, 2010; Dewar, Garcia, Cowan, 
& Della Sala, 2009), consistent with the hypothesis that mental effort disrupts 
consolidation in the hippocampus—at least for the recall memory tested in these 
experiments. However, this conclusion is limited because amnestic mild cognitive 
impaired patients could have damage that extends to extra-hippocampal regions (Dewar, 
Pesallaccia, Cowan, Provinciali, & Della Sala, 2012). 
Second, there is some evidence to support the idea that decreasing new long-term 
potentiation in the hippocampus retroactively facilitates memory (Wixted, 2004b). When 
a group of participants received midazolam—a benzodiazepine that inhibits new long-
term potentiation but not old long-term potentiation in the hippocampus—before learning 
new material, their memory for new material was inhibited. More importantly, inhibiting 
the learning of new material retroactively facilitated memory for old material compared 
to a saline group (Reder et al., 2007). In a similar design, alcohol retroactively facilitated 
prose recall compared to placebo (Moulton et al., 2005). Thus, giving participants a drug 
to reduce new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus retroactively facilitates memory, 
suggesting that new long-term potentiation can disrupt old long-term potentiation in the 
hippocampus. 
Third, there is some evidence to support the idea that increasing new long-term 
potentiation in the hippocampus retroactively interferes with memory. When rats were 
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given a tetanus (electrical stimulation to select neurons) or when rats explored a novel 
environment—manipulations that increase new but not old long-term potentiation in the 
hippocampus—their memory for hidden platform locations (Morris Water Maze task) or 
memory for shock environments (inhibitory avoidance learning) decreased (Brun, 
Ytterbo, Morris, Moser, & Moser, 2001; Izquierdo, Schröder, Netto, & Medina, 1999). 
Additionally, in the Morris Water Maze task, more frequent tetanuses decreased memory 
for hidden platform locations more than less frequent tetanuses (Brun et al., 2001), 
consistent with that idea that more new long-term potentiation caused more interference. 
Moreover, in the inhibitory avoidance learning task, the novel environment exposure 
decreased memory if exposure occurred one hour after learning but not six hours after 
learning (Izquierdo et al., 1999), consistent with the idea that new long-term potentiation 
disrupts consolidation of older memories. One intuitive implication from these findings is 
that if mental effort is new learning that increases new long-term potentiation and if 
increasing new long-term potentiation increases retroactive interference, then increasing 
mental effort should increase retroactive interference effects. One way to test this is to 
increase the degree of learning new material, which should increase retroactive 
interference. Indeed, a greater degree of learning new material caused more retroactive 
interference compared to a lesser degree of new learning (Archer & Underwood, 1951; 
Barnes & Underwood, 1959; Bäuml, 1996; Briggs, 1957), even when other factors that 
cause retroactive interference (e.g. retrieval practice and output interference) were 
controlled (Delprato, 2005). Thus, one possible explanation for why a greater degree of 
learning new material caused more retroactive interference is that better learning 
increased mental effort that disrupted consolidation. However, this possibility—that a 
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greater degree of mental effort increases retroactive interference—has not been directly 
addressed in recent research.  
One possible difference between early mental effort theories and Wixted’s (2004b) 
mental effort theory is related to new learning: Although Wixted’s (2004b) hypothesis 
suggests that mental effort is new learning that increases new long-term potentiation, 
early mental effort research suggested that new learning may not be required to cause 
retroactive interference. That is, tasks that did not necessarily tax new learning but that 
may have increased subjective mental effort caused retroactive interference. For example, 
some tasks were naming pictures, reading poetry, and solving logic or math problems. 
Thus, subjective mental effort could indicate when retroactive interference occurs. This 
view does not describe how mental effort could disrupt consolidation (cf. Müller & 
Pilzecker, 1900). Nevertheless, it is possible that these mental effort tasks could have 
caused retroactive interference by increasing new long-term potentiation in the 
hippocampus (Wixted, 2004b).  
Similarity and Response Competition 
Early similarity research typically showed that increasing similarity between old 
and new material decreased memory (McGeoch & McDonald, 1931; McGeoch, 1942; 
Robinson, 1920, 1927; Skaggs, 1925; Wixted, 2004b). For example, increasing the 
semantic relatedness between old and new material decreased word recall (McGeoch & 
McDonald, 1931). This and other similar findings prompted development of the cue-
overload paradigm to test an interference theory of similarity. 
The cue overload paradigm tests memory for word pairs. First, participants study 
a list of A-B word pairs: A is the stimulus or cue word, and B is the response or target 
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word. Then participants study a second list of A-D word pairs (the cue does not change 
between lists) or a second list of C-D word pairs (the cue changes between lists). Finally, 
participants are shown an ambiguous cue word at test (A) and must provide the target. If 
the task tests retroactive interference, memory for first-list targets is tested (B); if the task 
tests proactive interference, memory for second-list targets is tested (D). Interference 
occurs when participants produce more second-list intrusions (retroactive interference) or 
first-list intrusions (proactive interference) after learning an A-D list compared to 
learning a C-D list. This is commonly found in RI tasks (Gladis & Braun, 1958; Keppel 
& Zavortink, 1969; McGeoch, McKinney, & Peters, 1937; McGeoch, 1942), especially 
when the second list is learned just before recall (rather than earlier, e.g. Chandler & 
Gargano, 1998). Thus, the ambiguous cue (A) activates two competing responses (B and 
D), and this is called response competition: Response competition increases the number 
of second-list intrusions because the more recently presented word pairs (A-D) are more 
accessible than less recently presented word pairs (A-B).  
Response competition theory and its variants are the standard definition of 
interference today (J. R. Anderson & Bower, 1980; J. R. Anderson, 1974; M. C. 
Anderson et al., 1994; M. C. Anderson, 2003; Bäuml, 1996; Delprato, 2005; Dosher, 
1981; Dyne, Humphreys, Bain, & Pike, 1990; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky, 
1999, 2005; Tendolkar, Doyle, & Rugg, 1997; Verde, 2004). For example, building on 
the cue overload paradigm, the fan effect is the finding that increasing the number of 
alternative responses (e.g. A-B, A-C, A-D, A-E) increases retrieval time from memory (J. 
R. Anderson, 1974, but see Radvansky & Copeland, 2006b; Radvansky, 1999, 2005). In 
situations of response competition, the cue is not uniquely diagnostic of one memory for 
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a single target; instead, the cue is common across multiple memories of multiple targets, 
decreasing the effectiveness of the cue in retrieving the paired associate (Nairne, 2002). 
Thus, one interpretation is that similarity causes interference; that is, memories are 
similar to the extent that they share a cue. Consistent with this, when testing memory for 
single words, increasing semantic similarity decreased recall (McGeoch & McDonald, 
1931), and cue-overload increases the number of second-list intrusions (McGeoch, 1942). 
Inconsistent with this, when testing cued recall, increasing synonymy between second-list 
and first-list targets (i.e., increasing similarity) increases recall (Gladis & Braun, 1958). 
Therefore, a theory of similarity in which increasing similarity ‘always’ causes 
interference or ‘always’ causes facilitation can only explain a limited set of findings 
(Nairne, 2002; Osgood, 1949; Robinson, 1927; Skaggs, 1925). 
Mental Effort and Similarity 
 Some theories of retroactive interference have accounted for both mental effort 
and similarity. For example, as shown in Figure 2, Skaggs (1925) hypothesized that 
varying similarity can retroactively facilitate or interfere with recall. The far left x-axis 
shows that repeating material can increase memory (Harden, 1929; Robinson, 1927; 
Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2012). The middle of the x-axis shows that for different stimuli, 
increasing similarity can decrease memory (McGeoch & McDonald, 1931; Robinson, 
1920). However, there are exceptions to this: Learning different material, such as in the 
cue-overload paradigm (A-B vs. A-D), can increase and decrease memory (e.g. 
Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2012) depending on the detection of change between old and new 
material, at least in a proactive interference version of the cue-overload task (Jacoby, 
Wahlheim, & Yonelinas, 2013; Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2012). 
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Finally, the far right x-axis shows that dissimilar material can decrease memory because 
of mental effort (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925, 1933).  
A more recent model—adapted and shown in Figure 3—treats mental effort and 
similarity separately rather than as falling along a single similarity dimension (Dewar et 
al., 2007, fig 2). According to the model, mental effort disrupts hippocampal 
consolidation, and learning similar stimuli causes response competition (M. C. Anderson, 
2003; McGeoch, 1942; Skaggs, 1933). Like Skaggs (1925), this model suggests that 
learning new material, regardless of similarity, should cause mental effort (see also, 
Wixted, 2004b). Thus, similar and dissimilar material could disrupt hippocampal 
consolidation, and similar material, in addition, could cause response competition.  
 If similar material can disrupt consolidation and induce response competition, 
then similarity could enhance retroactive interference due to mental effort. For example, 
in a cue-overload paradigm, studying an A-D list could increase second-list intrusions (D) 
and disrupt consolidation of A-B items. If consolidation is disrupted, then the A-B 
memories memory might not move to long-term storage (e.g., Dudai, 2004) or might 
simply become less discriminable from other memories. If so, then similarity could 
enhance retroactive interference due to mental effort by increasing A-D accessibility 
while reducing discriminability among competing memories. Therefore, mental effort 
and similarity could interact to exacerbate retroactive interference effects. 
Retroactive Interference in Recognition Memory 
Recognition memory is the ability to tell if something was encountered previously. 
Recognition memory usually is tested by having participants study a list of items, usually 
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words or word pairs. At test, participants are shown old and new items, and participants 
decide whether each item is old or new.  
Recognition memory decisions are usually described with signal detection theory 
(also see Appendix, Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Signal detection theory separates 
response criteria from discrimination. Response criteria represents the willingness to 
respond a certain way (e.g., willingness to respond “old”), and discrimination is the 
ability to tell two categories apart (e.g. old vs. new). In recognition memory, each old and 
new item has one memory strength value, and, on average, old items have greater 
memory strength values than new items. If these memory strength values were known 
and could be plotted, they would form separate “old” and “new” distributions that vary 
and overlap. When the old and new memory strength distributions overlap, 
discrimination is worse compared to when these distributions are relatively non-
overlapping. In addition, a response criterion separates both distributions into “old” and 
“new” decisions: If a memory strength value exceeds the criterion, the item is called 
“old”; otherwise, the item is called “new”. Correct “old” decisions are called hits, and 
incorrect “old” decisions are called false alarms. Hits and false alarms can be used to 
calculate discrimination and response criteria (see Appendix for more details).  
Recognition memory performance can be explained by two retrieval processes, 
familiarity and recollection (Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, 
1991; Mandler, 1980; Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1994; Yonelinas, 2002). Familiarity is the feeling that something occurred, without 
recollecting when or where it occurred, and recollection is the retrieval of episodic details 
associated with a prior event. For example, upon seeing a news story, one might feel that 
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the story is familiar without remembering where or when it occurred. This is familiarity. 
Upon further thought, one might remember that they read that same story online a day 
earlier. This is recollection. Thus, on the basis of either familiarity or recollection, one 
would conclude that one read that news story before.  
The dual-process signal-detection model suggests that familiarity occurs to some 
degree for each item but that recollection occurs for some items but not others (Yonelinas, 
1994). Successful recollection leads to high-confidence responses: If a participant 
recollects episodic details, then they can be confident the item was studied. When 
recollection is unsuccessful, participants may vary in their confidence because decisions 
rely on familiarity. The dual-process signal-detection model can be used to estimate the 
relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to recognition memory performance 
(see Appendix; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; Yonelinas, 1994). 
The associative recognition task is driven primarily by recollection (Yonelinas, 
1997). In this task, participants study a list of word pairs (i.e., A-B, C-D: daisy-carnival, 
wound-teeth), and at test, participants discriminate between intact (i.e., A-B, C-D: daisy-
carnival, wound-teeth) and rearranged (i.e., A-D, C-B: daisy-teeth, wound-carnival) word 
pairs. On average, each word pair should be equally familiar because they consist of 
studied items, so familiarity should be relatively non-diagnostic of the pairing. Task 
performance, therefore, should rely more heavily on recollection of specific word 
pairings than familiarity. Successful recollection would lead to high-confidence hits for 
intact word pairs (i.e., correct “intact” decisions) and correct rejections for rearranged 
word pairs (i.e., correct “rearranged” decisions, also called recollect-reject; Rotello & 
Heit, 2000; Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000; Yonelinas, 1997). When 
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recollection fails, decisions would rely on familiarity, which would lead to hits and to 
false alarms (i.e., incorrect “intact” decisions) at all levels of confidence.  
Recollection and familiarity are considered independent processes mediated by 
different brain regions. Indeed, damage to the hippocampus preferentially impairs 
associative recognition memory (an indicator of recollection) over familiarity (Yonelinas, 
Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998), and damage to the perirhinal cortex 
preferentially impairs familiarity over recollection (Bowles et al., 2007, 2010; Yonelinas, 
2002). Thus, the evidence suggests that the hippocampus is necessary for recollection, 
and the perirhinal cortex is necessary for familiarity. Research generally supports this 
double dissociation, both behaviorally and neurologically (for reviews see Parks & 
Yonelinas, 2007; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002; but also see Wixted, 2007).  
As the neurological double dissociation suggests, the hippocampus preferentially 
drives recollection-driven memory, such as associative memory, whereas the perirhinal 
cortex preferentially drives familiarity-driven memory, such as item memory (Yonelinas, 
2002). Therefore, factors that affect hippocampal consolidation should affect recollection 
rather than familiarity. Consistent with this hypothesis, one rat study found that blocking 
hippocampal consolidation decreased associative memory but not item memory (Balderas 
et al., 2008). By contrast blocking perirhinal cortical consolidation decreased item 
memory but not associative memory. This double dissociation suggests that brain region-
specific consolidation is necessary for brain region-specific memory. Therefore, mental 
effort that disrupts consolidation in the hippocampus should primarily affect 
hippocampally-driven memory or memory processes, like recollection. There are two 
lines of evidence to support this relationship. 
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First, there is some evidence to suggest that decreasing new long-term 
potentiation in the hippocampus retroactively facilitates hippocampal-driven memory, but 
this does not occur for non-hippocampal memory (e.g. item memory). One way to 
decrease new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus is by manipulating sleep, though 
this might depend on different sleep stages: Slow-wave sleep may prioritize old long-
term potentiation over new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, whereas REM 
sleep may prioritize new long-term potentiation over old long-term potentiation in the 
hippocampus (Mednick, Cai, Shuman, Anagnostaras, & Wixted, 2011). Thus, slow-wave 
sleep rather than REM sleep could selectively enhance hippocampally-driven memory. 
Indeed, sleep selectively benefits recollection-driven and hippocampus-driven memory in 
humans and rats (Inostroza, Binder, & Born, 2013; van der Helm, Gujar, Nishida, & 
Walker, 2011). This hypothesis is directly supported with recollection and familiarity 
estimates derived from introspective judgments: Compared to REM sleep or remaining 
awake, slow-wave sleep increased recollection estimates but not familiarity estimates 
(Daurat, Terrier, Foret, & Tiberge, 2007). These data are consistent with the hypothesis 
that sleep selectively enhances consolidation necessary for hippocampally-driven 
memory and memory processes.  
Second, there is some evidence to suggest that consolidation in the hippocampus 
is temporally graded and is selectively important for hippocampally-driven memory, such 
as memory for locations or contexts (Yonelinas, 2002). In support of this hypothesis, 
blocking consolidation in the hippocampus made rats less likely to notice objects 
displaced from their original locations but did not affect object recognition memory 
(Oliveira, Hawk, Abel, & Havekes, 2010). This effect only occurred if consolidation was 
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blocked soon after study compared to a later delay. Thus, hippocampal consolidation may 
be temporally graded. Therefore, if, as Wixted (2004b) suggests, mental effort associated 
with new learning increases new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, then mental 
effort should selectively affect memory processes thought to depend on the hippocampus. 
Moreover, as earlier evidence suggested, increasing mental effort might also increase 
new long-term potentiation. If so, then increased mental effort should affect recollection 
rather than familiarity. This hypothesis was explored in the current study.  
Response competition and similarity effects in recognition memory are mixed. 
When testing item memory for full-page advertisements, learning similar new 
advertisements did not affect recognition memory (Heine, 1914, as cited in McKinney, 
1935). Also, although cue-overload typically reduces recall, when cue overload was 
manipulated in associative recognition memory, cue overload decreased hits, decreased 
false alarms, or did not affect hits and false alarms (Dyne et al., 1990). To explain these 
mixed results, Verde (2004) proposed that cue overload manipulations affect recollection 
and familiarity differently and that the pattern of results depend on recollection and 
familiarity contributions to performance. Thus, cue overload should make recollection 
less diagnostic of pairings because recollection of an associate would not necessarily 
produce the correct answer. This should decrease recollection-driven hits. Cue overload 
also increases the number of items in memory, so this should increase the number of 
matches between a probe and old memories. Given that familiarity is likely determined, 
in part, by this type of global matching mechanism (e.g. Ratcliff & McKoon, 2000), this 
should increase the number of hits and false alarms due to familiarity. This pattern of 
results is what Verde (2004) found in a fan effect study: Increasing the number of 
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associates decreased recollection hits but increased familiarity hits and false alarms. 
These data suggest that response competition should reduce recollection but that it might 
affect familiarity-related response criteria or discrimination (i.e., changes in hits and false 
alarms could signal changes in response criteria or discrimination). For the same reasons, 
increasing the similarity of the alternative responses (i.e., second-list targets) could 
reduce recollection and may or may not affect familiarity. 
Overall, the literature review suggests that there are two sources of retroactive 
interference, mental effort and similarity. Wixted (2004b) hypothesized that mental effort 
associated with new learning increases new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, 
disrupting consolidation of old memories (old long-term potentiation). By contrast, 
depending on the degree of similarity, similarity should promote response competition 
and thus interference. Therefore, mental effort should selectively disrupt recognition 
memory processes thought to depend on the hippocampus (recollection, not familiarity), 
whereas similarity should affect recollection and familiarity in different ways. Research, 
so far, has focused on free recall and cued-recall tasks with few studies investigating 
mental effort in recognition memory and no studies considering mental effort and 
similarity within the same experiment. Mental effort and similarity should affect recall 
and recognition memory similarly, at least to the extent that they rely on similar recall-
like processes (Dyne et al., 1990; Okada, Vilberg, & Rugg, 2012; Yonelinas, 2002) 
The Current Study 
The current study asked whether mental effort and similarity cause retroactive 
interference in associative recognition memory. Experiment 1 asked whether the degree 
of mental effort affects recollection and familiarity estimates differently at different TPIs. 
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Experiment 2 asked whether the degree of mental effort affects recollection and 
familiarity estimates differently for higher versus lower similarity.  
Experiment 1 asked if mental effort affects recollection. Like past research testing 
main effects of mental effort (mental effort vs. rest) and main effects of TPI (Lechner et 
al., 1999; Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925; Wixted, 2004b), Experiment 1 
compared associative recognition memory performance after rest and after mental effort 
presented at different TPIs. The current experiments extended this by inducing different 
degrees of mental effort at different TPIs (e.g. Archer & Underwood, 1951, as cited in 
Wixted, 2004b). This design addressed several shortcomings of previous experiments. In 
the past, rest periods were filled (e.g. reading); compared to mental effort, rehearsal may 
have been more likely during rest; and different tasks could have induced different 
degrees of mental effort. In the current experiment, participants rested in silence with the 
experimenter present; potential differences in rehearsal were reduced by manipulating 
degree of mental effort; and only one mental effort task was used (math problems). As a 
manipulation check for rehearsal, participants rated the frequency of spontaneous 
remindings; as a manipulation check for degree of mental effort, participants rated their 
subjective experience of mental effort.  
Experiment 2 asked whether mental effort and similarity affect recollection and 
familiarity estimates. The mental effort predictions were the same as in Experiment 1. 
For similarity, past research showed that cue overload (fan effect) reduced recollection 
hits and increased familiarity hits and false alarms (Verde 2004). Recollection was 
reduced because recollection of a response would not necessarily lead to the correct 
answer. Thus, if the similarity among competing responses is increased, as in Experiment 
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2, then recollection estimates should decrease. For familiarity, increases in hits and false 
alarms could indicate a change in response criteria or in discrimination. Therefore, it is 
unclear if and how similarity would affect familiarity estimates. Finally, an interaction 









The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine whether mental effort and the temporal 
point of interpolation (TPI) interact to affect recollection and familiarity estimates in an 
associative recognition task. As Figure 3 shows, participants were randomly assigned to 
be in a control group, or they were randomly assigned to groups engaged in a low or high 
mental effort task presented 0-, 10-, or 20-minutes after study. Mental effort was 
manipulated by requiring participants to mentally solve either easy addition problems 
(e.g., 2 + 2 = ?) or difficult subtraction problems (e.g., 83 – 9 = ?). Solving easy math 
problems should require less mental effort than solving difficult math problems. 
Moreover, math problems are highly dissimilar from word pairs, which should minimize 
response competition effects.  
It was hypothesized that solving difficult rather than easy math problems would 
decrease recollection estimates. Similarly, solving either problem type at earlier rather 
than later TPIs should decrease recollection estimates. Finally, mental effort and TPI 
should interact such that more mental effort decreases recollection estimates more at 
earlier rather than later TPIs. This interaction would support the hypothesis that mental 
effort causes retroactive interference by disrupting consolidation. Also, recollection 
estimates should be smaller after any experimental condition than after the control 
condition, which would replicate early mental effort research. Because evidence suggests 
that familiarity does not depend on the hippocampus and because there is no evidence 
that new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus disrupts non-hippocampal memory, 
mental effort and TPI should not affect familiarity estimates, but only to the extent that 
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mental effort selectively disrupts hippocampally-driven memory. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 140, Male = 52) with ages ranging from 18 to 56 years old (M = 
20.92 years, SD = 5.45 years) were recruited from university courses and were randomly 
assigned to test conditions (n = 20 per condition). They were tested individually with the 
experimenter present and given course credit for participation. 
Participants were screened based on their responses to a pre-experimental 
questionnaire: medical conditions (e.g., memory-related neurological disorders), 
medications taken (e.g., benzodiazepines), loss of consciousness for more than five 
minutes, and length of time speaking English (e.g., must be native English speaker or 
speaking English longer than 20 years). All participants met criteria. However, some 
participants were excluded due to experimenter error (n = 6) and later re-run to equate 
group sizes. 
Materials 
Word stimuli. Two lists of 240 nouns with middle Kucera-Francis word 
frequency values (e.g., 50-150), four to eight letters in length, were randomly selected 
from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Kucera & Francis, 1967). Each list was 
matched for word frequency, and within each list, words were randomly paired and then 
scanned for preexisting semantic or orthographic relatedness that might give the word 
pair a mnemonic advantage or disadvantage over other word pairs (e.g., chair-table or 
chair-fair). Each word pair served as intact or rearranged word pairs across conditions, 
and each word served as a cue or target word across conditions. 
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Math stimuli. Addition problems and subtraction problems (n = 35; randomly 
selected from larger pool, N = 1943) were recorded into 2.0 s audio files by a female 
research assistant. Analyzed math accuracy scores were the proportion of correctly 
answered math problems. 
Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale. To control for individual differences in math 
anxiety, participants responded to the Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale about how 
anxious they would feel in scenarios involving math (Hopko, Mahadevan, Bare, & Hunt, 
2003). Analyzed Abbreviate Math Anxiety Scale scores were individual averages across 
all ratings for each scenario.  
Post-experimental questionnaire. A questionnaire given after the final test 
assessed subjective mental effort, rehearsal frequency, and sleep intensity during the 
retention interval. Participants rated how much mental effort they experienced during the 
break (How mentally demanding was the break?) using a scale numbered from 1 
(minimum mental effort) to 7 (maximum mental effort); participants rated how frequently 
studied materials came to mind during the break (How frequently did the words you 
studied come to mind during the break?) using a scale numbered from 1 (not frequently) 
to 7 (very frequently); and participants rated how intense their sleep was (Please rate the 
intensity of your sleep during the break.) on a scale numbered from 1 (did not sleep at all) 
to 7 (slept for most or all of the break). 
Procedure 
After filling out informed consent forms and pre-experimental questionnaires, 
participants were tested individually on computers running E-Prime 1.2 (Schneider, 




As shown in Figure 3, under incidental learning instructions, participants studied 
120 word pairs (daisy-carnival, wound-teeth), and each word pair was presented one at a 
time in the middle of the screen for 3.5 s with a .5 s ISI. The order of word pairs was 
randomized for each participant. While the word pair was on the screen, participants 
rated how pleasant each word was together using on-screen response options 1 (pleasant) 
and 3 (not pleasant). Regardless of whether participants responded within 3.5 s, the 
computer automatically advanced to the next word pair after 3.5 s. This study section 
lasted eight minutes.  
During the 30-minute retention interval, participants were given different 
instructions depending on their randomly assigned condition. Participants in the control 
condition were told to relax and get as comfortable as they could. They could not talk to 
the experimenter, play on their phones, or surf the internet; they sat quietly with their 
eyes open. Participants in the interference conditions mentally solved math problems 
presented over headphones, responded using the keyboard, and received immediate 
feedback about their accuracy. The order of math problems was randomized for each 
participant. Once a participant heard a math problem (2.0 s), a response box appeared on 
the screen for up to 10.2 s. If the participant responded before 10.2 s, then the screen 
cleared and the correct answer appeared on screen for 1.5 s. After the correct answer 
appeared, participants saw a fixation cross that cleared after the remainder of the total 
trial time (12.2 s). If they did not respond after 10.2 s, participants saw the correct answer 
with the message, “Please respond more quickly”. Participants in the low mental effort 
condition solved easy addition problems, and participants in the high mental effort 
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condition solved difficult subtraction problems. Although an 85% accuracy cut-off was 
initially intended to exclude participants who put forth too little or too much effort, all 
participants were included despite having math accuracy scores less than 85%. This is 
because the math problems chosen were more difficult than anticipated (see Table 1). 
Participants solved math problems for eight minutes.  
Participants also solved easy or difficult math problems at different TPIs. 
Participants in the 0-minute condition solved addition or subtraction problems 
immediately after study and then rested for the remaining 20 minutes. Participants in the 
10-minute (or 20-minute) condition first rested for 10 minutes (or 20 minutes), and then 
solved addition or subtraction problems. Then participants rested for the remaining 12 
minutes (or 2 minutes). A sound signaled math problem onset for the 10- and 20-minute 
conditions, and the same sound signaled test onset after the final break. Instructions for 
each break period and math problem period were given before participants began each 
break or solved math problems. The entire retention interval was 30 minutes. 
During the associative recognition test, participants rated their confidence in their 
decisions about whether word pairs were intact or rearranged. Intact word pairs were 
word pairs that were the same at test as they were at study (daisy-carnival, wound-teeth), 
and rearranged word pairs were recombined from original word pairs (daisy-teeth, 
wound-carnival). Each word pair appeared one at a time in the middle of the screen, 
randomized for each participant, with the confidence scale displayed on-screen 
throughout the test. Ratings 4-6 corresponded to word pairs participants thought were 
intact, and ratings 1-3 corresponded to word pairs participants thought were rearranged. 
Six meant that participants were absolutely sure the word pair was intact, 5 meant less 
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sure, and 4 meant guessing. It was the same for the other ratings: 1 meant that 
participants were absolutely sure the word pair was rearranged, 2 meant less sure, and 3 
meant guessing. Testing was self-paced, and participants were encouraged to spread their 
responses out across the scale so that over the course of the testing session, all responses 
were used. After the test, participants filled out the post-experimental questionnaire, were 
debriefed, and then given course credit.  
Results 
Experiment 1 examined whether mental effort and the TPI interacted to affect 
recollection and familiarity estimates in an associative recognition test. All signal-
detection and model estimation procedures are briefly outlined in the Appendix. The 
dependent measures examined were da (discrimination between intact and rearranged 
word pairs), recollection estimates, recollect-reject estimates, familiarity estimates, and 
post-experimental questionnaire scores. As a reminder of the predictions, increased math 
problem difficulty (mental effort) should decrease recollection estimates more at earlier 
(0-minute) than later (10- or 20-minute) TPIs. If mental effort does not affect 
consolidation outside of the hippocampus (Balderas et al., 2008; Wixted, 2004b) and if 
familiarity depends on the perirhinal cortex rather than the hippocampus (Parks & 
Yonelinas, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002), then mental effort should not affect familiarity (d’) .  
Data screening and analysis  
Within each condition, data were screened for univariate outliers (|z-scores| > 3.29, 
p < .001) and normality assumptions (Shapiro-Wilks test p < .05, visual inspection of 
histograms, and |skewness| and |kurtosis| values > 1). Most data did not meet normality 
assumptions, so non-parametric analyses are reported for all statistics, unless otherwise 
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noted. In most cases, no differences in the patterns of results emerged for parametric and 
non-parametric tests. Differences are footnoted. Alpha was set to .05 for all analyses 
unless otherwise noted. Marginal significance was considered if a p-value was 
between .05 and .10. 
If the data met parametric assumptions, the main effect of mental effort—
including the control condition—was assessed using a one-way ANOVA. The main 
effect of TPI and the mental effort by TPI interaction were assessed as part of a 2 x 3 
ANOVA. In addition, planned t-tests were conducted on marginal means to assess the 
mental effort and TPI main effects. Also, planned t-tests were conducted on means in the 
mental effort by TPI conditions to assess the interaction. 
 If the data did not meet parametric assumptions, the main effects of mental effort 
(including the control condition) and TPI (excluding the control condition) were assessed 
using the Kruskall-Wallis test. In addition, planned comparisons using Mann Whitney U-
tests were conducted on marginal means to assess main effects. The non-parametric 
interaction was assessed using the adjusted rank transformation test, which analyzes 
individual interaction scores predicted by the general linear model (Leys & Schumann, 
2010). Each observed score is a linear combination of the grand mean (μ…), factor effects, 
interactions, and sampling error. Given that the grand mean is constant and sampling 
error varies around 0, Leys and Schumann (2010) suggested that only the marginal factor 
means need to be removed to reveal the interaction scores (see also Rosnow & Rosenthal, 
1995). To do this, each row and column marginal mean was subtracted from each 
individual score. Technically, the remaining score includes the grand mean (baseline), the 
predicted interaction score, and sampling error. Then, like other non-parametric 
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techniques, the remaining individual scores are rank averaged disregarding condition. 
Finally, an ANOVA is performed on the averages of the predicted interaction rankings. 
Only the interaction term is interpreted. In addition to this analysis, planned t-tests were 
conducted on the interaction rankings from the mental effort by TPI conditions to assess 
the non-parametric interaction. Reported effect size for non-parametric main effects are 
based on χ2, called Cramer’s V, which can be considered as the proportion of maximum 
possible variation accounted for by a factor.   
In the non-parametric interaction analyses, the marginal mean from the control 
condition was not subtracted from each individual score and was not included in rankings. 
This is because the primary interest of the interaction was between mental effort and TPI, 
disregarding the control condition. This resulted in a 2 x 3 between-subjects ANOVA 
where only the interaction term was interpreted (see previous paragraph). Disregarding 
the control condition, however, limited direct comparisons between rankings in these 
conditions and raw control condition scores. 
Another set of planned comparisons used t-tests (parametric) or Mann Whitney 
U-tests (non-parametric) to assess differences between the control condition and each of 
the other conditions. This analysis was conducted as a replication of early mental effort 
research comparing memory after rest and after a mental effort task.  
A final set of planned comparisons used t-tests to compare each group score to the 
lowest value possible. For example, for scale items, the lowest score was a ‘1’. For 
primary measures, this score was often ‘0’. This analysis was conducted to assess 
whether the mean scores in each condition were greater than the lowest value.  
Descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in two Tables: Table 1 contains 
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post-experimental questionnaire measures, and Table 2 contains the primary measures. 
Although mostly non-parametric tests were conducted, means and standard deviations are 
presented in the tables to facilitate understanding of the patterns in the data. In addition, 
the results of each statistical test is presented in these tables, including the main effects, 
interactions, and planned comparisons. For significant (p < .05) and marginally 
significant effects (.05 < p < .10), results and average non-parametric rankings (or means, 
if applicable) are presented in the main text. Otherwise, the main text presents only high-
level summaries of the results.  
Counterbalances 
To determine that counterbalancing did not affect any outcome, a series of 2 x 2 
between-subjects parametric ANOVAs were conducted for each dependent variable. No 
statistically significant counterbalance effects emerged, although some marginally 
significant effects did occur (all ps > .05). These analyses are not reported further. 
Post-experimental questionnaire data and math measures 
Presented next are results for post-experimental ratings of subjective mental effort, 
rehearsal, and sleep intensity. Also included are analyses for Abbreviated Math Anxiety 
Scale scores and math accuracy. Significance and effect sizes of omnibus tests along with 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. 
How mentally demanding was the break? As Table 1 shows, the main effect of 
mental effort was significant, χ2(2) = 34.125, p < .0001, Cramer’s V = .349. Planned 
Mann Whitney U-tests on marginal means revealed that participants experienced less 
mental effort between the easy and difficult conditions, MEasy = 41.83 and MDifficult = 
79.17, p < .0001; and marginally less in the easy than in the unfilled conditions, MEasy = 
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37.91 and MUnfilled = 48.28, p = .064. There were no differences in mean non-parametric 
rankings between the difficult and unfilled conditions. The main effect of TPI and the 
interaction were not significant.  
Planned Mann Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control condition 
revealed that participants experienced more mental effort in the unfilled condition than in 
the Easy-10-minute condition (non-parametric rankings: MUnfilled = 23.95 > MEasy, 10 Minutes 
= 17.05, p = .043). This comparison was marginal for the Easy-20-minute condition (non-
parametric rankings: MUnfilled = 23.63 and MEasy, 20 Minutes = 17.18, p = .054). Planned t-
tests comparing each group to the lowest scale value revealed that each group 
experienced more mental effort than 1 (ts(19) > 2.666, ps < .015), suggesting that 
participants reported some level of mental effort relative to none at all. Overall, the 
mental effort manipulation changed subjective mental effort ratings, although not always 
in the manner predicted. 
How frequently did the words you studied come to mind during the break? 
As Table 1 shows, the main effects of mental effort, of TPI, and the interaction were not 
significant, suggesting that participants rated their degree of rehearsal similarly across 
conditions. Planned Mann Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control 
condition confirmed these findings. Planned t-tests comparing each group to the lowest 
scale value revealed that participants indicated that studied words frequently came to 
mind during the break (ts(19) > 2.666, ps < .015). 
Please rate the intensity of your sleep during the break. As Table 1 shows, the 
main effect of mental effort, of TPI, and the interaction were not significant, suggesting 
that participants rated their sleep intensity similarly across conditions. Planned Mann 
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Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control condition confirmed these 
findings. Planned t-tests comparing each group to the lowest scale value revealed that 
participants indicated that sleep intensity was greater than 1 (ts(19) > 2.643, ps < .016), 
suggesting that participants’ sleep intensity was greater than no sleep. 
Average Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale scores. As Table 1 shows, the main 
effect of mental effort, of TPI, and the interaction were not significant, suggesting that 
participants had similar Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale scores across conditions. Thus, 
math anxiety did not confound any effect on the primary measures. Planned Mann 
Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control condition confirmed these 
findings. Planned t-tests compared each group to the lowest scale value, and this analysis 
revealed that participants had Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale scores greater than 1 
(ts(19) > 3.199, ps < .005), suggesting that participants in each group had at least some 
math anxiety relative to none at all.  
Math Accuracy. As Table 1 shows, a 2 x 3 parametric ANOVA (no control 
condition) revealed a significant main effect of mental effort, F(1, 114) = 157.616, p 
< .0001, ηp2 = .580, with larger math accuracy scores in the easy condition (M = 99.4%) 
than in the difficult condition (M = 69.23%), suggesting that participants did better on the 
easy than difficult math problems. The main effect of the TPI and the interaction were not 
significant. These results confirm that participants performed more poorly on the difficult 
than on the easy math problems. 
Signal-detection and model estimates 
Presented next are the signal-detection measures and model estimates, and the 
model is described in more detail in the Error! Reference source not found.. 
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Significance and effect sizes of omnibus tests along with means and standard deviations 
are presented in Table 2.  
da. As Table 2 shows, the main effect of mental effort, of TPI, and the interaction 
were not significant, suggesting that participants discriminated intact from rearranged 
word pairs to a similar degree across conditions. Planned Mann Whitney U-tests 
comparing each condition to the control condition confirmed these findings. Planned t-
tests comparing each group to the lowest theoretical value revealed that participants had 
da scores greater than 0 (ts(19) > 7.910, ps < .0001), suggesting that participants 
discriminated intact from rearranged word pairs in each group more than what would be 
expected by chance.  
Dual-process signal-detection model fit. As indicated in the Appendix, 
recollection, recollect-reject, and familiarity estimates were derived using the dual-
process signal-detection model (Yonelinas, 1994). Before conducting statistical analyses 
on process estimates, it was important to determine how well the model fit individual 
subjects’ confidence response data. Model fit indices were calculated based on χ2 with 2 
df. If an estimated χ2 was less than the critical χ2 value (3.84), then the model fit 
individual subject data adequately (p > .05).  
Within each condition, the percentage of participants for which the dual-process 
signal-detection model did not fit the data (p < .05) was calculated. This descriptive 
analysis revealed that the model fit the data for most participants across conditions. The 
largest number of participants for which the model did not fit was four participants in the 
Difficult-20 minute condition (80% had good model fit). The smallest number of 
participants was one participant in the unfilled condition and the Difficult-0 minute 
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condition (95% had good model fit). Although the estimates for these participants may 
not have been estimated properly, it was still decided to retain these participants for 
analysis given that the goal was to generalize any effects to the population. Nevertheless, 
inclusion and exclusion of these participants did not change the pattern of results, so 
statistics with all participants included are reported. 
Recollection. As shown in Table 2, the main effect of mental effort was not 
significant, but the main effect of TPI was significant, χ2(2) = 7.94, p = .019, Cramer’s V 
= .168. As Figure 5 shows, planned Mann Whitney U-tests on marginal means revealed 
larger recollection estimates after 20 minutes compared to 0- or 10-minutes (U-tests: M0 
Minutes = 40.93 = M10 Minutes = 40.08, p = .870; M0 Minutes = 33.88 < M20 Minutes = 47.13, p 
= .011; M10 Minutes = 34.48 < M20 Minutes = 46.53, p = .020). The interaction was not 
significant. Planned Mann Whitney U-tests testing the interaction revealed partial support 
for the TPI main effect (U-tests: MEasy, 0 Minutes = 16.73 < MEasy, 20 Minutes = 24.28, p = .041; 
MEasy, 10 Minutes = 17.15 < MEasy, 20 Minutes = 23.85, p = .070). Planned Mann Whitney U-tests 
comparing each condition to the control condition were not significant. Planned t-tests 
comparing each group to 0 revealed that all recollection estimates were greater than 0 
(ts(19) > 6.216, ps < .0001), suggesting that recollection did occur at least to some degree 
within each condition. 
Recollect-reject. As Table 2 and Figure 6 show, the main effect of mental effort 
was marginally significant, χ2(2) = 5.542, p = .063, Cramer’s V = .141. Planned Mann 
Whitney U-tests assessing the mental effort marginal means revealed that recollect-reject 
estimates were smaller after some mental effort than after rest: MUnfilled = 49.65 > MEasy = 
37.45, p = .023; MUnfilled = 48.70 > MDifficult = 37.77, p = .044. The main effect of TPI was 
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not significant. Planned Mann-Whitney U-tests assessing the TPI marginal means 
revealed a marginally significant difference between the 10-minute and 20-minute 
conditions, M10 Mins = 44.75 > M20 Mins = 36.25, p = .057.  
The non-parametric interaction was significant, F(2, 114) = 5.60, p = .005, ηp2 
= .09. Planned t-tests on interaction rankings suggested that mental effort mattered for the 
0-minute and 10-minute conditions, but the direction was opposite of what was predicted 
for the 10-minute condition (interaction rankings: MEasy, 0 Mins = 71.50, MDifficult, 0 Mins = 
48.00, MEasy, 10 Mins = 37.05, MDifficult, 10 Mins = 58.35, MEasy, 20 Mins = 82.50, and MDifficult, 20 
Mins = 66.05; results: MEasy, 0 Mins > MDifficult, 0 Mins, p = .024; MEasy, 10 Mins < MDifficult, 10 Mins, p 
= .037; MEasy, 20 Mins = MDifficult, 20 Mins, p = .106). Additionally, recollect-reject estimates 
were smallest in the 10-minute condition compared to the other TPI conditions for easy 
math problems (interaction rankings: see above; results: MEasy, 10 Mins < MEasy, 0 Mins, p 
= .003; MEasy, 10 Minutes < MEasy, 20 Mins, p < .0001). There were no differences among TPI 
conditions for difficult math problems1.  
Planned Mann Whitney U-tests comparing each condition to the control condition 
were significant for the following conditions: Easy-10 Minute (MUnfilled = 24.70 > MEasy, 10 
Mins = 16.30, p = .013); Difficult-0 Minute (MUnfilled = 24.25 > M0 Minutes = 16.75, p = .024); 
Difficult-20 Minute (MUnfilled = 25.05 > M20 Minutes = 15.95, p = .006); and marginally 
significant for Easy-20 Minute (MUnfilled = 23.60 > MEasy, 20 Mins = 17.40, p = .062). In each 
case, recollect-reject estimates were larger in the control condition than in the other 
                                                           
1 The parametric tests revealed a different pattern of results for the interaction. This different pattern of 
results likely occurred because of low marginal mean values that potentially reversed the pattern. The 
interaction was significant, F(2, 114) = 5.463, p = .005, ηp2 = .087. Uncorrected follow-up t-tests revealed 
that, for the 10-minute condition, recollect-reject estimates were larger in the Difficult (M = .135) than Easy 
(M = .033) conditions, p = .005. In addition, for the Difficult condition, recollect-reject estimates were 
larger in the 10-minute condition (M = .135) than in the 0-minute condition (M = .050, p = .018) and in the 
20-minute condition (M = .025, p = .022). 
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conditions, suggesting that solving easy or difficult math problems at various delays 
decreased recollect-reject estimates. Planned t-tests compared each group to 0 and 
revealed that recollect-reject estimates were greater than 0 (ts(19) > 2.108, ps < .049), 
except for the recollect-reject estimates in the Difficult-20 Minutes condition (t(19) = 
2.044, p = .055). These comparisons suggest that participants in most groups relied on 
recollect-reject to some extent in the associative recognition task. 
Familiarity. As Table 2 shows, the main effect of mental effort, of TPI, and the 
interaction were not significant, suggesting that familiarity estimates were similar across 
conditions (see also Figure 7). Planned Mann Whitney U-tests comparing each condition 
to the control condition confirmed these findings. Planned t-tests comparing each group 
to 0 revealed that all familiarity estimates were greater than 0 (ts(19) > 4.549, ps < .0001), 
suggesting that all groups discriminated intact from rearranged items on the basis of 
familiarity more than what would be expected by chance. 
Discussion 
     Experiment 1 tested whether the degree of mental effort at different TPIs affected 
recollection and familiarity estimates in an associative recognition task. Experiment 1 
showed a medium-sized main effect of TPI, such that solving math problems 0 or 10 
minutes after study decreased recollection estimates relative to 20 minutes. This TPI 
effect was specific to recollection estimates: TPI did not affect familiarity estimates. In 
addition, mental effort and the mental effort by TPI interaction were not significant. 
These data are most consistent with the hypothesis that mental effort presented earlier 
rather than later after study disrupted consolidation necessary for recollection. 
Mental effort and TPI inconsistently affected recollection and recollect-reject 
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estimates. First, mental effort decreased recollect-reject but not recollection estimates 
relative to the control condition. Second, TPI affected recollection but not recollect-reject 
estimates. Third, the interaction showed that recollect-reject estimates increased, 
decreased, or did not change with mental effort depending on the TPI condition. If 
recollection and recollect-reject depend on the hippocampus, mental effort and TPI 
should have affected them similarly. In addition, the facilitating mental effort effects are 
not predicted by any theory.  
One reason for the inconsistent and null mental effort effects may be that mental 
effort was not manipulated appropriately. The current experiments assumed that 
increasing the mental demand of nonspecific tasks would cause retroactive interference, 
but this prediction was not consistently supported. Thus, these results join past research 
finding inconsistent mental effort effects: In some cases, mental effort decreased recall 
relative to rest (Baldwin & Shaw, 1895; Calkins, 1896; DeCamp, 1915; Lechner et al., 
1999; Lewy, 1895; Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; Münsterberg & Campbell, 1894; Skaggs, 
1925; Warren & Shaw, 1895), but, in other cases, mental effort did not affect recall in 
healthy controls (Dewar et al., 2010). Thus, the current results do not support the 
hypothesis that subjective mental effort, in and of itself, causes RI. 
Additional lack of support for the subjective mental effort hypothesis comes from 
the finding that performance did not change consistently with subjective mental effort 
ratings. Consistent with predictions, participants reported more subjective mental effort 
after solving difficult rather than easy math problems. Inconsistent with predictions, 
participants reported less subjective mental effort in the control condition and high 
mental effort condition compared to the low mental effort condition, regardless of TPI. 
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This latter result could have occurred because the question probed different information 
between the mental effort and control conditions. Perhaps control participants rated the 
content of their thoughts for mental effort, whereas participants in the math problem 
conditions rated the mental demand caused by solving the math problems. Thus, 
participants may have had different reference points for the scale (i.e., referencing 
different information and then basing their decisions on that referenced information). 
Another possible reason for the inconsistent mental effort effects is that current 
and past experiments did not account for long-term potentiation in the hippocampus: 
Some manipulations of mental effort may increase or decrease new long-term 
potentiation in the hippocampus to different extents (e.g. novel environment exposure, 
Wixted, 2004b), which could cause different amounts of retroactive interference. If so, 
then the current results suggest that subjective mental effort and new long-term 
potentiation in the hippocampus are independent—at least in the current experiments. 
This independence would make it difficult to find behavioral manipulations that affect 
new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus. 
Recollection estimates were similar in the high mental effort condition and the 
control condition, but they were smaller in the control condition than in the 20-minute 
condition. These results are problematic because they suggest that the control condition 
did not control mental effort. One reason for the lack of control is that participants could 
have been pre-occupied with their thoughts, and these thoughts could have been 
‘mentally effortful’. Often, participants indicated they thought about what they were 
going to do after the experiment or about an upcoming test. However, it is unclear why 
30 minutes of this would somehow be worse for recollection than 22 minutes of planning 
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and eight minutes of solving easy or difficult math problems. Overall, while the TPI 
effect is consistent with a consolidation hypothesis, the other mental effort effects are 




 EXPERIMENT 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine how mental effort and similarity affect 
recollection and familiarity estimates in a cue-overload version of the associative 
recognition task. As Figure 8 shows, participants were randomly assigned to be in a low 
or high mental effort group. Mental effort was manipulated between-subjects by having 
participants solve easy or difficult anagrams of second-list targets in between study and 
test. Similarity was manipulated within-subjects by having participants learn a second list 
of word pairs where the targets were similar (synonyms) or dissimilar (random) to first-
list targets (e.g., study: A-B; interference: A-B’ or A-D). 
If increased mental effort increases retroactive interference, then participants who 
solve difficult anagrams should have smaller recollection estimates than participants who 
solve easy anagrams. If similarity increases response competition, then studying similar 
word pairs should increase competition between responses (Gibson, 1940; McGeoch, 
1942). Past research found that increasing the number of associated responses in the cue-
overload paradigm decreased recollection hits and increased familiarity hits and false 
alarms (Verde, 2004). Thus, mental effort and similarity were expected to reduce 
recollection estimates. Like Experiment, mental effort should not affect familiarity 
estimates because familiarity does not seem to depend on the hippocampus (Eichenbaum, 
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007). In contrast to mental effort, similarity could affect 
familiarity in two ways: It might affect familiarity estimates, a measure of discrimination, 
or it might affect response criteria (Verde, 2004). To measure familiarity in the current 
experiments, however, familiarity was estimated across different response criteria (see 
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Appendix). It is currently unknown if mental effort and similarity interact to affect 
memory performance. However, any observed interaction would help understanding of 
the roles of mental effort and similarity in RI (see General Discussion). 
Method 
Participants 
Experiment 2 had 64 participants (Males = 9) with ages ranging from 18 to 64 
years old (M = 20.84 years, SD = 6.85 years) were randomly assigned to conditions (n = 
32 per condition). Participant selection and exclusionary criteria were the same as in 
Experiment 1. Participants were tested individually with the experimenter present for the 
procedure. 
Materials 
Word stimuli. Initially, the top 120 synonym pairs were selected from prior 
research because they had similarity ratings (Dey, 1969; Hilgard, 1951). However, for 
counterbalancing purposes, additional lists were needed, so a total of 960 randomly 
selected words (Kucera & Francis, 1967) were added to these words. These words were 
given to two independent groups (n = 10): One group rated pairs for similarity, and 
another group solved difficult anagrams of each word. These ratings served as the basis 
for word selection, where, ultimately, 16 lists of single words were constructed and used 
in the experiment. Each list contained 30 words. These lists were balanced for word 
frequency and anagram accuracy, with difficult anagram accuracy ranging from 58.0% to 
66.7%. This resulted in two similar word pair lists (A-B’) and two dissimilar word pair 
lists (A-D) that were rotated across participants. Similar lists (scale: not similar 0 to 3 
very similar, see Hilgard, 1951) had average similarity ratings of 2.39 and 2.48, and 
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dissimilar lists had average similarity ratings of .32 and .37 (cf. Dey, 1969). 
Counterbalancing. Four lists of words were created, which included cue words 
and target words for the study and interference phases. The cue words (A) were the same 
cue words for all participants, and the study targets (B) changed across participants. For 
the interference lists, similar targets (B’) were necessarily yoked to the study targets (B). 
For ease, the dissimilar targets (D) also were yoked to the study targets (B). Although the 
study (B) and similar targets (B’) did not change across participants, the study (B) and 
dissimilar targets (D) changed across participants such that these targets served as study 
or dissimilar targets equally often across participants. However, only 60 dissimilar and 60 
similar word pairs were shown to a participant at a time. In addition, all A-B word pairs 
were interfered with using similar and dissimilar word pairs across participants. Each 
participant studied 120 A-B word pairs and then studied a second 120 word-pair list, with 
half consisting of similar A-B’ word pairs and the other half consisting of dissimilar A-D 
word pairs .   
Post-experimental questionnaire. Participants responded on a 10-point scale, with 10 
being the highest value and 1 being the lowest value, to the following questions: How 
hard did you try to solve the anagrams?; How often did you think about the word pairs 
from the pleasantness judgments task?; How difficult did you find the anagram task?; 
How often did you think about the word pairs from the anagram task?; During the break 
periods, how often did you rest or sleep?; and an open-ended question assessed whether 
participants were aware of the similarity manipulation, Did you notice anything about the 





Experiment 2 is briefly outlined in Figure 8. As an overview of the procedure, 
participants first were given two practice sessions designed to familiarize them with the 
anagram procedure. Then, participants began a pleasantness judgment task, which served 
as an incidental learning procedure for the A-B word pairs. Afterward, participants began 
the break section, completed the anagram procedure, and then had another break section. 
Similarity and mental effort were manipulated within the anagram task. Finally, 
participants took an associative recognition test and were given a post-experimental 
questionnaire. Then they were debriefed. 
Because the anagram task was difficult to understand, the experimenter helped 
participants practice the anagram task in two different ways before starting the 
pleasantness judgments task. This allowed the experimenter to assess participant 
understanding and took approximately 10-15 minutes per participant. The first practice 
phase was untimed and allowed the participant to become familiar with applying an 
anagram rule (see below) for four trials. The second practice phase was timed and 
mimicked the later anagram task for 16 trials, 4 trials for each of the four word lengths 
(4-7 letters).  
After participants finished practicing, participants were instructed on how to 
respond in the pleasantness judgment task. The pleasantness judgment task was the same 
as in Experiment 1, except participants read aloud each word pair while making the 
pleasantness judgments. This study section lasted eight minutes. 
In the retroactive interference phase, using the same instructions as in Experiment 
1, participants were told to rest for 10 minutes. Then they heard a sound that signaled the 
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start of the anagram task. The experimenter reviewed the anagram task instructions with 
the participants, and then pressed the spacebar to begin the anagram task when they were 
ready. The experimenter recorded all correct, incorrect, and missed answers, as well as 
when participants mispronounced words. 
On any given trial in the anagram task, participants first saw and read aloud a cue 
word, which was the same as what they saw during study. After 1.5 s, the second-list 
target appeared next to the cue, but this target was “hidden” in an anagram. This second-
list target was either similar to (synonym) or dissimilar from the first-list target. Each 
second-list target was scrambled according to an easy rule (daisy-icrcle: 213456, wound-
apper: 21345) or a difficult rule (daisy-iclecr 245613, wound-aerpp: 24513), depending 
on the mental effort condition. The rule always appeared below the anagram. Once the 
anagram appeared, participants had 4.5 s to solve it and say the answer out loud. After 4.5 
s, a neutral sound signaled the end of the trial, and then participants saw the correct 
answer on screen for 1.0 s. They read aloud this answer if they did not solve the anagram 
in time or if they solved the anagram incorrectly. The anagrams were presented in one of 
sixteen fixed random orders to allow the experimenter to record participant responses. 
The anagram order was restricted such that no one similarity word type (similar or 
dissimilar) appeared more than three times in a row. The anagram task lasted for 15 
minutes, after which, participants took a 5-minute break. Then, the participant heard a 
sound to signal test onset. The entire retention interval lasted for 30 minutes.  
Like Experiment 1, during the test phase, participants rated their confidence in 
their decisions about whether intact and rearranged pairs were intact or rearranged. After 
the test, participants completed the post-experimental questionnaire, were debriefed, and 
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then assigned course credit. 
Results 
      Experiment 2 tested how mental effort and similarity affect recollection and 
familiarity estimates in a cue-overload version of the associative recognition task. The 
same signal detection measures and process estimates from Experiment 1EXPERIMENT 
1 were used in Experiment 2 (see Appendix). To assess how well participants solved 
anagrams, an anagram accuracy measure was calculated as the proportion of correctly 
solved anagrams. 
Data screening and analysis plan 
In general, all dependent variables were analyzed in the same way as in 
Experiment 1, unless otherwise noted. Within conditions, each dependent variable was 
examined for univariate outliers (|z-scores| > 3.29, p < .001), normality assumptions 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, p < .05, visual inspection of histograms, and |skewness| and 
|kurtosis| values > 1), homogeneity of variance assumptions (Levene’s test, p < .05), and 
sphericity assumptions (Mauchly’s test of sphericity, p < .05).  
If the data met parametric assumptions, a 2 x 2 between-within ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the interaction between mental effort (between-subjects) and similarity (within-
subjects), and main effects were examined but interpreted in terms of statistically significant 
interactions. Planned t-tests were conducted on marginal means and cell means to assess main 
effects and interactions, respectively. If the data did not meet parametric assumptions, a non-
parametric 2 x 2 between-within ANOVA was conducted on rankings of individual interaction 
scores (Leys & Schumann, 2010). Main effects were examined using Mann-Whitney U-tests 
(between-subjects: mental effort) and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (within-subjects: similarity). 
Alpha was set at .05 for all tests, and marginal significance was considered if a p-value was 
between .05 and .10. Statistics are reported with all participants unless otherwise noted. As 





Table 3 (post-experimental data) and Table 4 (primary measures). 
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Post-experimental questionnaire data 
As Table 3 shows, the post-experimental questionnaire scores were, for the most 
part, unrelated to the manipulations. Non-parametric and parametric independent-samples 
comparisons revealed significant differences as a function of anagram difficulty for the 
following variables: non-parametric rankings: How difficult did you find the anagram 
task?, MDifficult = 43.09 > MEasy = 21.91, p < .0001 ; and marginally significant differences 
for How hard did you try to solve the anagrams?, MDifficult = 36.31 and MEasy = 28.69, p 
= .090. Thus, participants rated that the difficult anagrams were more difficult than the 
easy anagrams.  
Anagram accuracy. A Table 3 shows, parametric analyses revealed that 
participants solved more easy than difficult anagrams, F(1, 62) = 41.61, p < .0001, ηp2 
= .402; more similar than dissimilar anagrams, F(1, 62) = 10.41, p = .002, ηp2 = .144; and 
the interaction was also significant, F(1, 62) = 12.95, p = .006, ηp2 = .173. Planned t-tests 
revealed significant differences: Similar (MEasy = .968 > MDifficult = .744, t(33.122) = 6.23, 
p < .0001); Dissimilar (MEasy = .970 > MDifficult = .692, t(32.723) = 6.42, p < .0001); and 
Difficult (MSimilar = .744 > MDissimilar = .692, t(31) = 3.79, p = .001), except for the 
difference between anagram accuracy for: Easy (MSimilar = .968 and MDissimilar = .970, t(31) 
= -.43, p = .672). This pattern of results suggests that participants solved more easy than 
difficult anagrams; however, for difficult anagrams, participants solved more similar than 
dissimilar targets, but the same difference was not true for easy anagrams.4. 
                                                           
2 Levene’s test was significant, F(1, 62) = 57.9, p < .0001, indicating different variances between groups.  
3 Levene’s test was significant, F(1, 62) = 60.6, p < .0001, indicating different variances between groups.  
4 It should be noted that the non-parametric tests revealed a different pattern of results. This likely arose 
because of ceiling effects that may have affected the predicted interaction rankings for easy anagrams. The 




Signal-detection and model estimates 
Presented next are the signal-detection measures and model estimates (see Error! 
Reference source not found.).  
da. As Table 4 shows, the main effect of anagram difficulty, of similarity, and the 
interaction were not significant, suggesting that da was similar across conditions. 
Dual-process signal-detection model fit. As in Experiment 1, descriptive 
analyses were conducted to determine whether the estimates derived using the dual-
process signal-detection model were based on a good-fitting model (Yonelinas, 1994). 
Within each condition, the percentage of participants for which the dual-process signal-
detection model fit the data (p > .05) was calculated. This descriptive analysis revealed 
that the model fit the data for all participants across conditions, except for one person in 
the Difficult-Similar condition. Statistics with all participants included are reported given 
that the results were the same including and excluding that one participant. 
 Recollection. As Figure 9 shows (see also Table 4), the main effect of anagram 
difficulty was marginally significant, U(128) = 1.709, p = .087, with numerically larger 
recollection estimates after solving difficult rather than easy anagrams (MDifficult = 70.09 > 
MEasy = 58.91). The main effect of similarity and the interaction were not significant. 
Recollect-reject. As Figure 10 shows (see also Table 4), the main effect of 
anagram difficulty, of similarity, and the interaction were not significant, suggesting that 
recollect-reject estimates were similar across conditions.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
successfully solved more difficult than easy anagrams. The main effect of similarity was significant, W(64) 
= 857.00, p < .01, suggesting that participants solved more dissimilar anagrams than similar anagrams. The 
interaction was also significant, suggesting that the above results occurred because participants solved 
fewer easy, similar anagrams than any other target type (ps = .0001 to .029). No other significant 
differences emerged. These data suggest that average rankings of anagram hit rates were lowest in the easy 
similar anagram condition 
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Familiarity. As Figure 11 shows (see also Table 4), the main effect of anagram 
difficulty, of similarity, and the interaction were not significant, suggesting that 
familiarity estimates were similar across conditions. Listwise exclusion of one outlier and 
the participant for which the dual-process signal-model provided a poor fit did not change 
the results. 
Discussion 
     The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine whether mental effort and similarity 
affect recollection and familiarity estimates in an associative recognition task. To this end, 
mental effort was controlled within each level of similarity. Participants solved either 
easy or difficult anagrams of cue-overloaded word pairs in which the second-list target 
was similar to (synonym) or dissimilar from the first-list target. The results showed 
marginal and non-significant effects: The main effect of mental effort on recollection 
estimates was marginally significant, but the effect was in the opposite direction of 
predictions  
Experiment 2 failed to detect similarity effects on any memory measure. One 
possible reason why similarity did not cause retroactive interference is because the 
current study had participants learn A-D and A-B’ word pairs 10 minutes after study 
rather than just before test. Another possible reason is that studying the second-list list 
could have produced an equal amount of facilitation and interference. This might be 
expected if, for some A-D and A-B’ word pairs, participants noticed and later recollected 
the change at test, as was shown in a proactive interference version of the cue-overload 
task (Jacoby et al., 2013; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2012; Wahlheim, 2014). Noticing and 
later recollecting change can produce proactive facilitation, whereas failing to recollect 
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that change can produce proactive interference. If these proactive interference effects 
generalize to similar retroactive interference paradigms, then studying a second list could 
produce null cue-overload effects. However, similarity should have made change 
detection more difficult, which should increase retroactive interference. It should be 
noted, though, that the retroactive interference experiments used orthographically similar 
materials, suggesting that change detection effects can occur for similar materials.  
In addition to the null similarity effects, the null mental effort effects were 
replicated from Experiment 1. One possible reason for the null mental effort effects in 
Experiment 2 is that all participants solved anagrams 10 minutes after study rather than 
immediately after study. Mental effort effects should be greatest when presented 
immediately after study rather than after a delay. However, Experiment 1 showed null 
mental effort effects even when presented 0 minutes or 10 minutes after study, suggesting 
that a longer delay is necessary (i.e., 20 minutes).  
Another possible reason for the null mental effort effects in Experiment 2 is that 
the recollection and familiarity estimates in Experiment 2 may have not been accurate 
because recollection and familiarity were estimated based on fewer responses than what 
is typically recommended (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). This could have made these 
estimates less sensitive to retroactive interference effects. However, although the number 
of responses collected differed across experiments, the results were replicated. Thus, the 
current results join other studies finding weak or null mental effort effects (Dewar et al., 
2010), suggesting that mental effort may not cause retroactive interference. 
The results are consistent with the view that subjective mental effort is not 
sufficient to observe retroactive interference. This is supported by the finding across 
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experiments that subjective mental effort was present and manipulated successfully, and 
retroactive interference was not found. In addition, the results with similarity are not 
consistent with past research demonstrating response competition effects. Future research 
should account for other factors that may be responsible for detecting retroactive 






     The goal of this research was to examine some potential causes of retroactive 
interference and whether they affect associative recognition memory. Early researchers 
found evidence for two causes of retroactive interference, mental effort and similarity. 
Mental effort was thought to disrupt consolidation, and similarity was thought to promote 
response competition during retrieval. Recent neurological evidence suggests that new 
long-term potentiation disrupts old long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, consistent 
with the hypothesis that mental effort disrupts consolidation by increasing new long-term 
potentiation in the hippocampus. Moreover, similarity may promote response competition, 
which should reduce recollection estimates but may or may not affect familiarity 
estimates (e.g., Verde, 2004). Finally, learning new material that is similar to old material 
may cause retroactive interference because learning new material could have both 
specific (e.g., response competition) and nonspecific (e.g., mental effort) effects (Dewar 
et al., 2007; Wixted, 2004b), which could lead to an interaction between these two types 
of RI.  
How Should Mental Effort Be Defined? 
The current results do not support the hypothesis that mental effort causes 
retroactive interference by disrupting consolidation in the hippocampus. Participants 
indicated that they found the mental effort manipulations mentally demanding or difficult 
in both experiments. Despite this, mental effort in Experiment 1 decreased recollect-
reject estimates in some conditions, increased recollect-reject estimates in one TPI 
condition, or did not affect recollect-reject estimates in another TPI condition. In addition, 
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mental effort did not affect recollection estimates in either experiment. There are several 
possibilities for these inconsistent mental effort effects.  
Mental effort may not have affected memory in the manner predicted because the 
parameters of the experiment were not optimal for detecting those effects. First, the 
mental effort tasks used in the current experiments lasted eight minutes (Experiment 1) or 
15 minutes (Experiment 2), whereas previous studies used shorter durations of mental 
effort (e.g., 3 minutes, Skaggs, 1925). Thus, mental effort may have been at its upper 
limit—though this seems unlikely given that overall memory performance was similar 
across conditions. Second, the retention interval length in the current experiments lasted 
30 minutes, whereas previous studies used shorter retention intervals—six minutes 
(Dewar et al., 2007; Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925). Memories would 
consolidate less within six minutes than within 30-minutes (the current study), making 
them more vulnerable to retroactive interference. Third, and finally, recognition tasks are 
usually easier than recall or cued-recall tasks, which may have reduced sensitivity of the 
current measures to retroactive interference effects. Nevertheless, recall and recognition 
may share a common set of underlying processes, which may be related to the degree to 
which recollection is diagnostic of task performance (Okada et al., 2012; Yonelinas, 
2002). Thus, mental effort should have caused retroactive interference, at least in terms of 
overall performance or for recollection estimates, but this was not found. Understanding 
the boundary conditions of mental effort effects is important for constraining theorizing 
about mental effort as a cause of retroactive interference.  
Another possibility is that mental effort may not cause retroactive interference. 
Although Wixted (2004b) treats mental effort as nonspecific retroactive interference that 
 61 
 
disrupts consolidation in the hippocampus, mental effort—the subjective mental demand 
of a task—does not seem to cause retroactive interference, at least in the current 
experiments. Moreover, if mental effort effects have an upper limit or if mental effort 
causes more retroactive interference in shorter than in longer retention intervals, then 
these boundary conditions suggest that mental effort may be limited in how much 
everyday forgetting it can explain.  
Temporal Point of Interpolation and Consolidation 
In contrast to the inconsistent mental effort effects, TPI affected recollection 
estimates but not familiarity estimates. The TPI effect is consistent with past research 
demonstrating a temporal gradient of RI (Wixted, 2004b). This past research showed 
more forgetting when new material was learned immediately after study compared to a 
delay. Thus, this TPI effect is consistent with the hypothesis that nonspecific tasks can 
disrupt consolidation in the hippocampus (Wixted, 2004b). These findings extend past 
research showing weak TPI effects in controls (Dewar et al., 2010, 2009), which used a 
10-minute retention interval. The current experiments found no differences between 0- 
and 10-minute retention intervals: a 20-minute retention interval increased recollection 
estimates. In addition, this TPI effect is consistent with research demonstrating that slow-
wave sleep rather than REM sleep selectively benefited recollection estimates (Daurat et 
al., 2007). Thus, the TPI effect specific to recollection is consistent with the hypothesis 
that nonspecific tasks can disrupt consolidation in the hippocampus.  
The TPI effect is also consistent with past research on forgetting curves. 
Ebbinghaus found that the proportion of forgotten information continually decreases over 
time (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913). Moreover, the same mathematical function describes 
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forgetting curves using different retention intervals and materials (Wixted, 2004a; Wixted 
& Ebbesen, 1991). This suggests that memories consolidate over time, becoming 
increasingly less susceptible to retroactive interference (Ebbinghaus, 1885; Jenkins & 
Dallenbach, 1924; Wixted, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2010). Thus, the ever-decreasing 
forgetting rate suggests that consolidation increasingly protects memories from 
retroactive interference over time. If, as Experiment 1 suggests, consolidation is more 
related to recollection than familiarity, then forgetting curves for recollection and 
familiarity should differ. One study showed that recollection estimates derived from 
introspective reports decreased quickly from 0 to 7 days but did not change from 7 and 14 
days (Tunney, 2010). By contrast, familiarity estimates were stable across these same 
time periods. These data suggest that the forgetting curve for recollection estimates might 
differ from the forgetting curve for familiarity estimates, at least for these three retention 
intervals. However, other research suggests that this pattern might not be typical 
(Gardiner & Java, 1991; Hockley & Consoli, 1999; Yonelinas, 2002). Limitations of 
introspective judgments notwithstanding (McCabe, Geraci, Boman, Sensenig, & Rhodes, 
2011), forgetting curves for recollection and familiarity estimates may also be 
confounded with differences in memory strength, with recollection-driven memory 
generally being stronger than familiarity-driven memory (Yonelinas, 2002). Future 
research should establish the temporal gradients (e.g., forgetting curves) of recollection 
and familiarity estimates (e.g., derived from dual-process signal detection model) equated 
for overall memory strength (e.g., high-confidence recollection and familiarity) to 
determine the relative importance of consolidation (e.g., Wixted, 2004b), or RI, to 
recollection and familiarity. 
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 One main limitation of the current experiments is that the TPI effect could have 
occurred because participants rehearsed new material more during the 20-minute 
condition than during other TPI conditions. While this cannot be completely ruled out, 
there are several reasons why this explanation seems unlikely. First, participants studied 
word pairs under incidental learning instructions. Second, the experimenter was with the 
participant throughout the procedure, and there was no evidence of overt rehearsal 
(though this does not rule out covert rehearsal). Third, rehearsal ratings were similar in all 
conditions. If these ratings indexed rehearsal, then there were little to no differences in 
amount of rehearsal across conditions. Fourth, recollection estimates were worse in the 
control condition than in the 20-minute condition. If participants were expected to 
rehearse more during a longer than a shorter break, then this condition should have been 
associated with increased recollection estimates (though this condition should have been 
associated with increased estimates for other reasons, too). Fifth, and finally, some 
participants spontaneously indicated that they were surprised that there was a test after 
the experiment, though this was not measured explicitly. Future studies might directly ask 
participants whether they knew a test was coming and if they prepared in any way for it. 
Therefore, the current results are most consistent with a consolidation hypothesis, such 
that a nonspecific task meant to induce retroactive interference disrupted consolidation 
necessary for recollection. 
Similarity  
In Experiment 2, similarity did not affect recollection or familiarity estimates. 
Similarity was manipulated by having participants study similar and dissimilar word pairs 
(A-B’ vs. A-D) 10-minutes after studying a list of A-B word pairs in an associative 
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recognition task. Past research has shown that increasing the number of competing 
responses decreases recollection hits and increases familiarity hits and false alarms in an 
associative recognition task (Verde, 2004). Given this, it was expected that response 
competition effects would have been greater under similar than dissimilar conditions (A-
B’ vs. A-D). However, no evidence of retroactive interference was found. There are 
several possibilities for why no similarity effect was found. 
One reason for the null similarity effect may be that the A-D and A-B’ lists were 
not studied close enough to retrieval. Past research has shown that studying the second 
list closer to retrieval increases response competition effects (J. R. Anderson, 1974; 
McGeoch, 1942; Newton & Wickens, 1956; Postman & Alper, 1946; Wixted, 2004b). In 
Experiment 2, participants studied the interfering word pair list 10 minutes after study. 
The reason for this choice was to increase the ability to detect a potential mental effort by 
similarity interaction, at a point where mental effort or response competition did not 
dominate the other. Using a similar design, reducing the retention interval length from 30 
minutes to 20 minutes could increase similarity effects because the second list would be 
learned closer to retrieval. In addition, the interaction might be more likely to be detected 
because the mental effort and similarity effects would likely be stronger. Reducing 
retention interval length could also reduce factors contributing to random error (e.g. 
participant thoughts). 
Another possible reason for the null similarity effects is that similarity may have 
been at its upper limit (see Figure 2; Harden, 1929; Robinson, 1927). Indeed, increasing 
similarity by increasing synonymy of second-list targets reduced RI effects in a cued 
recall task, consistent with the far left x-axis of Skaggs similarity curve (see Figure 1; 
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Gladis & Braun, 1958). However, Experiment 2 did not detect retroactive facilitation or 
retroactive interference, so it is unclear how similarity affected performance in the 
current experiments. 
Another possible reason for the null similarity effects is that similarity could 
facilitate or interfere with memory in the cue-overload paradigm, depending on the 
detection of change, which could result in null overall effects (e.g., Wahlheim & Jacoby, 
2011, 2013). In a proactive interference version of the cue-overload paradigm, 
participants who detected change (A-B vs A-D) and successfully recollected that change 
at test showed proactive facilitation. However, when change recollection was 
unsuccessful, participants showed typical proactive interference effects (Jacoby et al., 
2013). The authors surmised that once change was detected, the memory of the A-B word 
pair became integrated with the memory for the A-D word pair, preserving temporal 
order, such that, when cued at test, participants later recollected that change at test. This 
was called a recursive reminding because the test pair reminded the participant of the 
previous reminding during the interference phase. Thus, although there were no overall 
effects after learning interfering a list of A-D and C-D word pairs, this null effect could 
have reflected a mix of both proactive facilitation and interference effects that depended 
on successful change recollection.  
If the proactive effects that depend on change recollection generalize to similar 
retroactive interference paradigms, then performance in the current experiments also 
could reflect a mix of retroactive facilitation and interference. When presented A-D or A-
B’ word pairs in the current experiments, participants could have detected and later 
recollected the change between some items but not others. If change recollection 
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occurred in Experiment 2, increasing the similarity between first- and second-list targets 
should have decreased change detection, which would have decreased the probability of 
change recollection. This would have increased retroactive interference —but retroactive 
interference was not found in Experiment 2. It should be noted, however, that change 
recollection was demonstrated with orthographically similar materials (e.g., knee-bone vs. 
knee-bend). However, the effect of similarity on change recollection has not been 
systematically investigated.  
Future research should help clarify the role of remindings in retroactive 
interference and proactive interference, especially because remindings may represent a 
large proportion of everyday memory (Hintzman, 2011). A remindings hypothesis dates 
back to Müller and Pilzecker’s (1900) theory of retroactive interference. This theory 
claimed that spontaneous (and uncued) remindings retroactively facilitated memory by 
promoting consolidation (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900, as cited in Lechner et al., 1999). By 
contrast, the recursive remindings hypothesis claims that recursive remindings (cued) 
proactively facilitate memory by preserving the temporal order of old and new memories, 
as explained above. The role of spontaneous remindings in facilitating consolidation has 
not been tested, probably because they could be viewed as rehearsal (for example, 
Wixted, 2004b called spontaneous remindings “spontaneous rehearsal”). Nonetheless, 
remindings—whether cued or uncued—could facilitate memory in a way different than 
rehearsal. As the proactive interference research suggests, remindings could facilitate 
memory through memory integration processes. As the original theory of retroactive 
interference suggests, remindings could also facilitate consolidation of old material. 
These possibilities should be explored further in both retroactive interference and 
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proactive interference tasks and in recall and recognition tasks. Differences between 
recall and recognition tasks could help answer the question of whether learning new 
material affects the underlying memory or access to that memory. 
Choice of Model 
The current studies derived recollection and familiarity estimates using the dual-
process signal-detection model (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002). It is possible that the 
assumptions of the dual-process signal-detection model constrained the sensitivity of 
recollection and familiarity estimates to retroactive interference. However, retroactive 
interference did not occur in da, a measure of overall discrimination that accounts for 
differences in the variances of the old and new memory strength distributions (Macmillan 
& Creelman, 2005). This suggests that the choice of model was not at issue because 
retroactive interference was not detected in overall performance.  
A related point is that if the assumptions underlying the model were not valid, 
recollection and familiarity estimates might be inaccurate. As an illustration, if 
recollection was continuous (like familiarity)—that is recollected information varies in 
memory strength—then there would be variations in confidence (Ratcliff, Sheu, & 
Gronlund, 1992). If the dual-process signal detection model estimated recollection as a 
probability, the resulting sample estimate would underestimate true recollection because 
the estimate would only capture high-confidence responses (rather than also including the 
lower-confidence responses). However, this may not have been an issue because 
familiarity was associated with all confidence responses, and there was no effect of 
mental effort on familiarity. Thus, it seems unlikely that the specific assumptions of the 
model were related to the mental effort effects observed in the current experiments. 
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A final point to consider is model fit, which was good for most subjects in both 
experiments (see Results). If the model fit were poor, the parameter estimates might be 
less sensitive to retroactive interference. However, visual inspection of responses and the 
descriptive analyses reported earlier suggest that the dual-process signal-detection model 
fit the data well. This suggests that recollection and familiarity were estimated 
appropriately. Therefore, the current data do not suggest that the choice of model 
compromised power.  
Concluding Remarks 
In the beginning of his review article, Wixted (2004b) noted that the standard 
story of forgetting “has changed over the years from a theoretically coherent (and 
ultimately incorrect) interference-based account of forgetting to an atheoretical laundry 
list of factors that may or may not play a role” (p. 236). In the endeavor to better 
understand everyday forgetting, the current experiments examined mental effort and 
similarity effects in recognition memory: There was a temporal effect of learning new 
material on recollection estimates. This is consistent with the notion that nonspecific 
retroactive interference disrupts consolidation specifically for hippocampally-driven 
memory processes (e.g. Daurat et al., 2007). The current experiments also showed that 
subjective mental effort, in and of itself, probably does not cause retroactive interference, 
though further experimentation on the boundary conditions of mental effort is necessary 
to firmly support this conclusion.  
As Wixted (2004b) supposed, it may be that nonspecific tasks cause RI only to 
the extent that they increase new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus (cf. Dewar et 
al., 2007). If true, it may be difficult to find manipulations that reliably increase new 
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long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, though, rat research suggests that exposure to 
novel environments increase new long-term potentiation in the hippocampus (Ballarini, 
Moncada, Martinez, Alen, & Viola, 2009; Martínez, Alen, Ballarini, Moncada, & Viola, 
2012; Wixted, 2004b). Future research should establish manipulations that link 
nonspecific tasks to retroactive interference via hippocampal new long-term potentiation 
(e.g., exposure to virtual novel environments).  
If remindings are important in proactive interference tasks, they may also be 
important in retroactive interference tasks. Thus, future research should investigate the 
roles of nonspecific retroactive interference, similarity, and remindings in recall and 
recognition to better understand when learning new material increases retroactive 
facilitation—via memory integration and consolidation—and increases retroactive 
interference—via disrupting memory access or the underlying memory representations. 
Over 100 years have passed since Müller and Pilzecker (1900) discovered retroactive 





          
Table 1 
          Inferential and Descriptive Statistics for Post-Experimental Questionnaire Ratings and Math Accuracy as a Function 
of Mental Effort and Temporal Point of Interpolation (Experiment 1)         
 
Omnibus χ2(2) Unfilled Easy Math Problems Difficult Math Problems 
DV ME TPI **ME x TPI Control 0 Min 10 Min 20 Min 0 Min 10 Min 20 Min 
Mental effort 34.13(.35)b 1.90(.09) 1.14(.02) 2.85(1.87) 2.30(1.45) 1.70(1.17)a 1.60(.94)† 3.70(1.84) 3.30(1.53) 3.75(1.68) 
Rehearsal 0.46(.04) 1.35(.08) 0.48(.01) 2.15(1.53) 2.05(1.76) 1.95(1.28) 2.10(1.86) 2.10(1.86) 1.85(1.18) 2.70(1.98) 
Sleep 2.13(.09) 0.17(.03) 0.42(.01) 2.40(1.93) 2.90(1.97) 3.05(2.14) 3.05(1.82) 2.95(1.86) 2.70(1.72) 2.40(1.96) 
AMAS *0.02(.00) **0.04(.00) 0.08(.00) 2.80(.70) 2.82(.68) 2.81(1.01) 2.90(.67) 2.87(.58) 2.82(.72) 2.82(.73) 
Math % *157.62(.58)b **0.43(.01) 0.60(.01) -- 0.99(.01) 0.99(.01) 0.99(.01) 0.73(.20) 0.68(.16) 0.67(.20) 
Note. All inferential statistics were non-parametric, unless otherwise noted. The Omnibus section shows omnibus χ2 tests (or F-tests). Parenthetical 
information shows measures of effect size (Cramer’s V for χ2 and ηp2 for F-tests). The symbols for significance values in the Unfilled and math problems 
sections are based on planned comparisons to the unfilled condition. Means (standard deviations) are reported for ease of interpretation.  
DV = Dependent variable; ME = Mental effort (main effect); TPI = Temporal point of interpolation (main effect); ME x TPI = Mental effort x temporal 
point of interpolation (interaction); Mental effort = "How mentally demanding was the break?"; Rehearsal = "How frequently did the word pairs your 
studied come to mind during the break?"; Sleep = "Please rate your sleep intensity during the break."; AMAS = Abbreviate Math Anxiety Scale scores; 
Math % = Math accuracy. 
*F(2, 137) reported for parametric tests 
**F(2, 114) reported for parametric tests 
       †: .05 < p < .10 
         a: p < .05 
          b: p < .0001 




Inferential and Descriptive Statistics for Signal-Detection Measures and Model Estimates as a Function of Mental Effort and 
Temporal Point of Interpolation (Experiment 1) 
            
 
Omnibus χ2(2) Unfilled Easy Math Problems Difficult Math Problems 
DV ME TPI **ME x TPI Control 0 Min 10 Min 20 Min 0 Min 10 Min 20 Min 
da *0.26(.00) **0.97(.02) 0.46(.01) 1.35(.76) 1.51(.61) 1.34(.74) 1.57(.48) 1.35(.62) 1.44(.57) 1.59(.74) 
R 0.08(.02) 7.94(.18)a 0.05(.00) 0.42(.26) 0.39(.22) 0.38(.24) 0.52(.21) 0.38(.25) 0.39(.28) 0.52(.24) 
RReject 5.54(.14)† 3.62(.12) 5.60(.09)b 0.13(.14) 0.09(.12) 0.03(.12)a 0.07(.13)† 0.05(.11)a 0.14(.16) 0.03(.06)b 
Fam (d') 1.79(.08) 0.28(.03) 0.15(.00) 0.64(.57) 0.91(.64) 0.80(.69) 0.75(.52) 0.75(.63) 0.70(.48) 0.78(.77) 
Note. All inferential statistics were non-parametric, unless otherwise noted. The Omnibus section shows omnibus χ2 tests (or F-tests). Parenthetical 
information shows measures of effect size (Cramer’s V for χ2 and ηp2 for F-tests). The symbols for significance values in the unfilled and math 
problems sections are based on uncorrected multiple comparisons to the unfilled condition. Means (standard deviations) reported for ease of 
interpretation. 
DV = Dependent variable; ME = mental effort; TPI = temporal point of interpolation; R = Recollection; RReject = Recollect-reject; Fam (d') = 
Familiarity estimate; Accuracy = Overall accuracy; da = Discrimination; HR = Overall hit rate; FAR = Overall false alarm rate. 
*F(2, 137) 
         
**F(2, 114) 
         
†: .05 < p < .10 
         a: p < .05 
         b: p < .01 











Inferential and Descriptive Statistics for Post-Experimental 
Questionnaire Ratings as a Function of Mental Effort 
(Experiment 2) 
    
DV U(64) Easy Anagrams Difficult Anagrams 
Sleep 413.5 5.81(3.14) 4.72(3.22) 
Difficulty 851.0a 3.97(2.25) 6.88(1.93) 
Trying 634.0† 7.06(3.23) 8.94(1.08) 
AnagReh 503.5 5.03(2.65) 5.00(3.12) 
StudyReh 452.0 6.44(2.59) 5.88(2.41) 
Note. All inferential statistics were Mann-Whitney U-tests. Means 
(standard deviations) reported for ease of interpretation. 
DV = Dependent variable; Sleep = "During the break periods, how 
often did you rest or sleep?"; Difficulty = "How difficult did you 
find the anagram task?"; Trying = "How hard did you try to solve 
the anagrams?"; AnagReh = "How often did you think about the 
word pairs from the anagram task?"; and StudyReh = "How often 
did you think about the word pairs from the pleasantness judgments 
task?". 
† = .05 < p < .10 








       Inferential and Descriptive Statistics for Anagram Hit Rates, Signal-Detection Measures, and 
Model Estimates as a Function of Anagram Difficulty and Synonymy (Experiment 2) 
 
Omnibus U(128), W(64), or F(1,62) Easy Anagrams Difficult Anagrams 
DV AD SYN *AD x SYN Unrelated Related Unrelated Related 
*AnagHR 41.61(.40)b 10.41(.14)a 16.84(.21)b 0.97(.04) 0.97(.04) 0.69(.24) 0.74(.20) 
Accuracy 2161.50 37.00 1.49(.02) 0.65(.10) 0.65(.10) 0.65(.10) 0.68(.10) 
HR 2318.50 35.00 0.71(.01) 0.67(.17) 0.67(.17) 0.70(.12) 0.73(.11) 
FAR 2125.00 32.00 0.91(.02) 0.37(.18) 0.37(.17) 0.40(.16) 0.37(.16) 
da 2199.50 1237.50 1.29(.02)   0.87(.53) 0.86(.52) 0.90(.49) 1.04(.55) 
R 2405.50† 904.00 0.50(.01)   0.26(.20) 0.25(.22) 0.31(.20) 0.32(.21) 
RReject 2089.00 665.00 0.26(.00)   0.11(.15) 0.09(.13) 0.08(.11) 0.11(.14) 
Fam (d') 1969.00 733.00 0.11(.00)   0.39(.43) 0.42(.45) 0.35(.45) 0.46(.55) 
Note. All inferential statistics were non-parametric. Omnibus section shows values of omnibus Mann-
Whitney U-tests (anagram difficulty), Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Test (synonymy), or non-parametric 
interaction (F-tests). Parenthetical information shows effect sizes only for F-tests using ηp2. anagrams 
sections shows means (standard deviations) for ease of interpretation.  
AD = anagram difficulty; SYN = synonymy; DV = Dependent variable; AnagHR = Anagram hit rate; 
Accuracy = Overall accuracy; HR = Overall hit rate; FAR = Overall false alarm rate; da = discrimination; 
R = Recollection; RReject = Recollect-reject; Fam (d') = Familiarity estimate. 
*F(1, 62) 
      †: .05 < p < .10 
    
  a: p < .01 
    
  b: p < .0001 





Figure 1.  Theoretical inverted-U relationship between memory performance and the 
temporal point of interpolation (Wixted, 2004b). Memory performance is expected to be 
lower for when nonspecific retroactive interference occurs in the middle of a retention 





Figure 2. The Skaggs Hypothesis. This figure shows the relationships between retroactive 
facilitation and interference as a function of similarity between old and new materials 
(Skaggs, 1925; and later, Robinson, 1927). On the far-left x-axis, increasing similarity 
increases retroactive facilitation. In the middle of the x-axis, increasing similarity 
increases retroactive interference. Finally, on the far-right x-axis, even dissimilar stimuli 
can cause retroactive interference because of mental effort (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900; 




Figure 3. Retroactive Interference Model Adapted from Dewar, Cowan, and Della Sala 
(2007, Figure 15, p. 632). After encoding a stimulus (daisy), the memory consolidates 
and becomes increasingly less susceptible to retroactive interference. New material can 
vary in similarity, from highly dissimilar (89 – 6 = ?) to highly similar (lily). If similarity 
is high, the responses may compete when probed during retrieval, which is called 
response competition, In addition, learning similar or dissimilar material may be mentally 






Figure 4. Experiment 1 Procedure. Participants judged the pleasantness of 120 word pairs. 
Mental effort was manipulated between-subjects by having participants solve either easy 
problems (e.g., 1 + 3 = ?) or difficult problems (e.g., 83 – 9 = ?). Additionally, the 
temporal point of interpolation was manipulated between-subjects by having participants 
solve math problems either 0, 10, or 20 minutes after study. Participants in the control 
(unfilled) condition rested for 30 minutes. Participants then rated their confidence in 
decisions about whether word pairs were intact or rearranged, they completed a post-




Figure 5. Recollection Estimates in Experiment 1. Estimates are plotted as a function of 
math problem difficulty, rest (unfilled), and the temporal point of interpolation. Bars are 




Figure 6. Recollect-Reject Estimates in Experiment 1. Estimates are plotted as a function 
of math problem difficulty, unfilled (control), and the temporal point of interpolation. 
Bars are + 1 standard error of the mean. 




Figure 7. Familiarity (d’) Estimates in Experiment 1. Estimates are plotted as a function 
of math problem difficulty, rest (unfilled), and the temporal point of interpolation. Bars 







Figure 8. Experiment 2 Procedure. Participants read aloud and judged the pleasantness of 
120 word pairs (daisy-sphere, wound-teeth). Mental effort was manipulated between-
subjects and required participants to solve either easy (daisy-icrcle) or difficult (daisy-
iclecr) anagrams. The anagram targets were synonyms (daisy-circle) or unrelated words 
(wound-paper) to the studied targets. Participants then rated their confidence in decisions 
about whether word pairs were intact or rearranged, they completed a post-experimental 




Figure 9. Recollection Estimates in Experiment 2. Estimates are plotted as a function of 




Figure 10. Recollect-Reject Estimates in Experiment 2. Estimates are plotted as a 





Figure 11. Familiarity (d’) Estimates in Experiment 2. Estimates are plotted as a function 




     The following sections discuss, in brief a) the dependent variables derived from 
signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) and b) how recollection and 
familiarity process estimates were derived from the dual-process signal-detection model 
in an associative recognition test. 
Signal detection theory 
Signal detection theory applied to recognition memory allows researchers to 
separate measures of discrimination from response criteria, which are derived from two 
classes of responses to two classes of items. Discrimination is the ability to tell apart two 
classes of items; response criterion is a subjective threshold that represents the 
willingness to respond a certain way. In associative recognition memory tasks, 
participants respond “intact” or “rearranged” to intact and rearranged items (see Method). 
Hit rates measure the probability of correct responses to intact word pairs, and false alarm 
rates measure the probability of incorrect responses to rearranged word pairs.  
Hit rates and false alarm rates are related to discrimination (e.g., da) and response 
criterion (c) in the following manner. Discrimination is a standardized measure of the 
difference between hit rates and false alarms rates; response criterion is a standardized 
measure of the negative average of the hit rates and false alarm rates. Large positive 
standardized differences between hit rate and false alarm rate represent good 
discrimination; parallel changes in hit rates and false alarm rates reflect changes in 
response criteria (i.e., more or less willing to respond “intact”). Separating discrimination 
from response bias is important because standard performance measures, such as 
accuracy, confound them.  
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Dual-Process Signal-Detection Model Process Estimates 
The dual-process signal-detection model assumes that recollection occurs 
probabilistically across items, and when successful, the subject retrieves associative 
information about the item with high confidence. For intact items, this increases hit rates; 
for rearranged items, this increases correct rejections (i.e., 1 – False Alarm Rate), 
resulting in two measures of recollection: recollect-accept (henceforth, called recollection) 
and recollect-reject. Familiarity, by contrast, is a continuous signal-detection process, and 
so familiarity is estimated as a discrimination measure, or d’. For intact items, familiarity 
increases hits; for rearranged items, familiarity increases false alarms. Based on these 
relationships between hit rates and false alarm rates, the model relies on variations in 
response confidence that represent variations in response bias to compute estimates of 
recollection, recollect-reject, and familiarity (d’).  
To estimate the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to associative 
recognition test performance, an iterative maximum likelihood estimation procedure was 
used. Estimates were derived from an unpublished Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, authored 
by Colleen M. Parks. This procedure works by calculating the maximum likelihood 
estimate of recollection and familiarity  given observed hit rates and false alarm rates. 
The likelihood value is calculated using G2 based on the differences between observed 
and predicted hit rates and false alarms. These likelihood values are summed and then 
maximized using the Solver Add-in to yield the most likely recollection (R), recollect-
reject, and familiarity (d’) estimates given the data. To assess model fit, a χ2 value is 
calculated (which is an approximation of G2) and is tested against the critical χ2(2) (= 
3.84). If the observed χ2 exceeds the critical χ2(2), then the model fit is rejected at p < .05, 
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indicating poor model fit. It is important to note that the dual-process signal-detection 
model was fit to individual subject data rather than group averages. Past research has 
suggested that fitting to average rather than individual data inaccurately represents the 
true outcome (Malmberg & Xu, 2006; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007).  
There are also certain constraints imposed on parameter estimates during the 
model-fitting procedures. Familiarity (d’) was constrained to be no less than 0 (chance 
performance), and R and RReject were constrained to be between .000001 and .999999. 
These constraints were in place when estimating all parameters. For familiarity, negative 
d’ is unlikely because it means the participant had below chance performance (i.e., 
practically, they may have reversed the scale). For recollection, probabilities of less than 
0 or greater than 1 are not possible because they are probabilities.  
An additional consideration, however, comes from Macmillan and Creelman 
(2005) who, while discussing whether one should include negative d’ values in statistical 
analyses, suggested that only including d’ values greater than 0 may inflate the true, or 
population, d’ (p. 15). That is, negative d’ values may arise from sampling error when 
calculated over a small number of trials. When averaged over subjects, the negative 
values would be incorporated into a less biased population estimate. Otherwise, the 
estimate will be inflated. However, this is not the accepted means anymore because it 
allows for model overfitting that may produce nonsensical estimates. From the former 
perspective, constraining parameter estimates may result in biased estimates, whereas 
from the latter perspective, constraints may produce more sensible estimates without 
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